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to revealed knowledge undermines the entire natural theology project as 
historically understood.
How should one characterize this post-Humean natural theology 
project? The distinction between natural theology and revealed religion 
has been signifi cantly blurred. One can understand this as an argument 
against Hume, as a capitulation to Hume, or as the grateful refi nement of 
the natural theology project in light of Hume’s forceful and telling criti-
cisms of earlier, inadequate employments of natural theology. While this 
volume does not give a clear answer to this question, the work done within 
its pages aids greatly one’s att empts to grasp the place of natural theology 
in the broader religious context. In that regard, this volume is a valuable 
addition to contemporary Christian scholarship.
Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, by Denys Turner. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xix + 271. $70.00 (cloth), $29.99 (paper).
DAVID BRADSHAW, University of Kentucky
Denys Turner is a theologian and the author of The Darkness of God (1995), 
a well-received study of mystical theology. In the Preface to the present 
volume he remarks that his earlier book led some to object that he had 
taken apophaticism “to the point of apparently denying that we can say 
anything true of God,” as was not his intent (p. xiii). His goal in Faith, Rea-
son and the Existence of God is to redress that imbalance through a careful 
exploration of what reason can and cannot accomplish in relation to God. 
Specifi cally, Turner (a Roman Catholic) defends the position of the First 
Vatican Council that it is an article of faith that the existence of God can be 
known by natural reason. This might seem to place him at odds with the 
apophatic approach that he earlier defended. Turner, however, believes 
that natural theology and apophaticism are natural allies, for natural the-
ology properly pursued places reason “at the end of its tether,” asking 
“the sorts of questions the answers to which . . . are beyond the power of 
reason to comprehend” (p. xv). If there are rationally compelling proofs of 
the existence of God, as he believes there must be, “what the ‘proofs’ prove 
is at one and the same time the existence of God and that, as said of God, 
we have fi nally lost our hold on the meaning of ‘exists’” (p. 87).
It will be noticed that I say if there are such proofs. Although Turner 
is confi dent that such proofs must be available, he does not himself oﬀ er 
one, nor does he say where in the tradition they are to be found. He holds 
up Aquinas’s Five Ways as a model of how such proofs ought to be done, 
but he makes no att empt to rebut the standard objections to the Five Ways 
or to update Aquinas in contemporary terms. Surprisingly, near the end 
of the book it emerges that Turner’s preferred argument strategy would 
begin with the question, “why is there something rather than nothing?” 
This is of course the question famously posed by Leibniz. Turner seems to 
think that it would be preferable to develop the argument in a Thomistic 
rather than Leibnizian fashion, but he does not elaborate in any detail. His 
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eﬀ ort is limited to arguing, against Kantian or Russellian objections, that 
the question itself is a legitimate one.
Turner is aware that his failure to provide an actual argument for the 
existence of God may seem odd. As a theologian, however, he sees his 
own role as that of explicating the content of faith. Certainly the task of 
arguing that it is an article of faith that God can be proven to exist is signifi -
cant its own right. Turner sees the major resistance to this view as coming 
from the fear that to prove God’s existence is necessarily to diminish the 
mystery of God by placing God within a network of causal explanatory 
relationships. This suspicion, in turn, he traces back to the Scotistic rejec-
tion of analogy. If, as Scotus believed, any argument for the existence of 
God must use terms univocally in the premises (said of creatures) and the 
conclusion (said of God), then such an argument will indeed make God 
describable in the same way as creatures. That would be incompatible, not 
only with traditional apophatic theology, but with any proper regard for 
the divine mystery.
Turner’s reply to Scotus is a simple one. Although it is true that in a 
valid argument a term occurring more than once in the premises must bear 
the same sense (barring some explicit disambiguation) in those occurrences, 
there is no requirement that it do so in the conclusion as well. He illus-
trates the point with the terms ‘cause’ and ‘mutable thing’: each has a uni-
vocal meaning within the empirical domain, but when they are combined 
into the phrase “cause of every mutable thing,” the term ‘cause’ takes on a 
diﬀ erent meaning which can be understood only by extrapolation (p. 212). 
As Turner recognizes, this point was made years ago by Peter Geach in his 
“Causality and Creation” (reprinted in God and the Soul). It is surely correct 
as far as it goes. However, to go on to claim that in such an extrapolation 
we “lose our hold” on the meaning of the terms involved, and indeed that 
“we could not know the meaning of what we are justifi ed in att ributing” 
to God (p. 206), is quite unwarranted. Geach’s point is precisely that we do 
retain some sense of the meaning of the terms involved; otherwise there 
would be no purpose to doing the extrapolation. In the case of ‘cause,’ 
for example, we retain the basic understanding that if it were not for the 
action of God, creatures would not exist. That may not be all that is in-
volved in our ordinary understanding of cause, but it is certainly more 
than nothing.
Turner’s exaggeration at this point is symptomatic of a larger mis-
understanding. He seems to think of apophaticism primarily in terms 
of what we do or do not understand, so that a view of God is properly 
apophatic only if it leaves us with no clear understanding of what we 
mean in speaking of God. But traditionally apophatic theologians made 
at least one clear and defi nitive statement about God: God is not an in-
telligible object. By this they meant not exactly that He cannot be under-
stood by us, but that He is not an object of noēsis, “intellection.” Noēsis 
is the kind of thinking that “divides reality at the joints” (to use Plato’s 
metaphor) by becoming isomorphic to the actual character of the object 
thought. It fi gures centrally in Aristotle’s theory of the Prime Mover and 
Plotinus’ theory of Intellect, both of which (the Prime Mover and Intellect) 
are the single, fully actual act of noēsis which embraces all possible intel-
ligible content. To say that God is not an intelligible object (noēton) means 
108 Faith and Philosophy
that He is not the sort of being that can be embraced in the act of noēsis, 
for He has no intelligible structure—no form, essence, or defi nition—of 
the sort to which our thought can conform. It does not mean that we can-
not speak meaningfully of Him. The more apophatically inclined among 
the Church Fathers, such as Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzen, 
state clearly that we can and should form conceptions (ennoiai) and men-
tal images (phantasmata) of God. What we cannot do is form a noēma, the 
particular kind of concept that “latches on” to the object by mirroring its 
ontological structure.
It is remarkable that Turner, who surely must know the classical 
sources, says nothing about these matt ers. I suspect the reason is that he 
is determined to present Aquinas as an apophatic theologian. Although 
this is currently a fashionable view, it cannot be sustained without con-
siderable distortion of either Aquinas or apophaticism. Far from holding 
that God is not an intelligible object, Aquinas, like Augustine before him, 
holds that God is the supreme intelligible object, the one whom all rational 
beings achieve their telos in apprehending. All that Aquinas says about 
the unknowability of God pertains solely to this life, when our thinking 
is constrained to operate with mental images derived through the senses. 
(See, for example, the passage quoted by Turner on p. 43.) In the aft erlife 
the blessed, like the angels, will enjoy a direct vision of the divine essence. 
There could scarcely be a sharper contrast on this point between Aquinas 
and the Greek Fathers, who consistently teach that the divine essence re-
mains unknown even to the angels and the blessed.
Apophaticism thus understood might appear to be a rather stark and 
minimalist view. However, although the Greek Fathers deny the possibil-
ity of a conceptual knowledge of God, they do hold that there can be a 
direct experience of God, not only in the aft erlife but in the present life as 
well. By contrast, Aquinas (as Turner rightly notes) holds that “there is no 
experience of God of any kind in this life” (p. 120). Given the Thomistic 
view, it is no doubt correct that if natural reason is to know with certainty 
the existence of God, it must do so via rational demonstration. That is 
presumably why Turner leaps immediately from the proposition that God 
can be known to exist through the evidence of creation to the claim that 
this knowledge “could, at least theoretically, be expanded out into a formal 
proof” (p. 13)—a claim, incidentally, not made by Vatican I. He seems to 
overlook that there are many things one can know that one cannot prove, 
such as the immediate deliverances of perception and memory. This leap 
makes sense only on the assumption that natural reason is limited in its 
means of knowing God to rational demonstration.
For an alternative view, one has only to consider the biblical passages that 
have traditionally been cited on behalf of the possibility of natural theology. 
St. Paul says that “that which may be known of God is manifest in them [the 
unrighteous]; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of 
him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead” (Rom. 1:19–20, 
my italics). There is no reference here to a rational demonstration; Paul sim-
ply assumes that nature can be seen to be God’s handiwork. The same is 
true in the other passages traditionally cited in this vein, such as Acts 14:17, 
Wisdom of Solomon 13:1–5, and Psalms 19 and 104.
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One reason Turner is eager to insist on the possibility of rational dem-
onstration is that he wants the debate between theists and atheists to be 
“capable of being conducted on shared rational grounds” (p. xii). But to 
hold that God can be seen in nature, if one is in the proper moral and 
spiritual condition, is not at all to deny a role for rational argument. Just 
as one oft en has to argue with a friend in order to get him to see something 
that really ought to be obvious, rational argument may be of great help in 
achieving the right state of perceptive awareness regarding nature. (See 
on this point Del Ratzsch, “Perceiving Design” in God and Design, ed. Neil 
Manson [Routledge, 2003], pp. 124–44.) The church fathers certainly were 
not shy in using argument to refute materialist or polytheistic understand-
ings of nature. However, they typically understood their own argument, 
not as a demonstration that God exists, but as a way of explicating nature 
so as to make apparent to our sinful and fallen eyes something that in its 
own nature is perfectly evident. Thus St. Athanasius remarks: “as they tell 
of Phidias the sculptor that his works of art by their symmetry and by the 
proportion of their parts betray Phidias to those who see them although 
he is not there, so by the order of the universe one ought to perceive God 
its maker and artifi cer, even though He be not seen with the bodily eyes” 
(Contra Gentes, chap. 35). One ought to perceive. Certainly there is an impor-
tant role for rational argument here, but it is ultimately no more than that 
of opening the eyes to something that is plainly there.
In sum, it seems to me that Turner’s devotion to Aquinas leads him to 
misconstrue both the nature of apophaticism and the proper goals and 
character of natural theology. Nonetheless, the book oﬀ ers a useful cri-
tique of Scotistic univocity and of many pernicious and irrationalist trends 
in contemporary theology. Anyone who seeks to achieve an authentically 
Christian approach to philosophy will fi nd in it much food for thought.
The Most Real Being: A Biblical and Philosophical Defense of Divine Determinism, 
by J. A. Crabtree. Eugene, Oregon: Gutenberg College Press, 2004. Pp xvii 
& 384. $33.00.
ROBERT AARON JOHNSON, University of Oklahoma
This book is a defense of divine determinism: the doctrine that God 
causes every event to transpire exactly as it does. Chapters one through 
four are intended to introduce and motivate the book’s topics to a non-
philosophical audience. Chapter fi ve is an argument for divine determin-
ism from scripture. The philosophically interesting material starts with 
chapter six. In chapters six and seven, Crabtree argues that divine deter-
minism is implied by creation ex nihilo and that it is implied by divine 
foreknowledge. In chapter eight, he gives a separate philosophical argu-
ment for divine determinism. In chapters nine, ten and eleven, he defends 
divine determinism against the charge that it is inconsistent with human 
free will, that it is inconsistent with divine goodness given the existence 
and extent of evil, and that it undercuts our motivation to be good.
